2017-2018 FURTHER UPDATE TO GRAHAM GREENLEAF’S ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS – TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES

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In July 2017 I published on SSRN an update\(^1\) from mid-2014 to mid-2017 of my *Asian Data Privacy Laws – Trade and Human Rights Perspectives* (Oxford University Press, 2014), to accompany the publication of the paperback edition in July 2017. Purchase details and reviews of the book are on the OUP website.\(^2\)

This further update aims to cover developments to 31 October 2018. Most of the contents are abstracts of my articles in *Privacy Laws & Business International Report* (PLBIR),\(^3\) from which the details of what is abstracted here can be found. I recommend subscription to PLBIR if you wish to keep up-to-date with developments in Asian data privacy laws.

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International agreements

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam are signatories to the Comprehensive Regional Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement (CPTPP FTA), the successor to the failed TPP, which imposes significant limitations on the ability of parties to enact data export restrictions or data localisation requirements, beyond those found in the GATT. Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are not signatories to the CPTPP FTA, although they are entitled to accede to it because they are APEC members. So is China, but very unlikely to sign.

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199889

Free trade agreements (FTAs) don’t include requirements to strengthen data privacy laws, other than by vague and unenforceable gestures. While many FTAs are quite benign to privacy, others may be toxic to domestic privacy laws which impose restrictions on cross-border data transfers, but the toxicity varies. The European Union has made it clear that ‘EU data protection rules cannot be the subject of negotiations in a free trade agreement’, although existing EU rules can be reflected in FTAs.

In 2018, the threats to privacy legislation posed by FTAs have suddenly become more real. In February the US reiterated complaints against Chinese legislation restricting personal data exports, under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services, (GATS, 1995). In March, a FTA was signed by 11 Asia-Pacific countries (including neither the US nor China) which has much stronger anti-privacy provisions than GATS: the revised ‘Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (was the TPP, now the CPTPP). The US is now considering re-joining TPP, after the Trump administration initially pulled out. Two other Asia-Pacific FTAs are under re-negotiation (NAFTA) or negotiation (RCEP).

This article compares the approach being taken in each of these three FTAs (insofar as is known), and the GATS, and the potential effects of these agreements on data privacy laws. It concludes that, after decades during which free trade agreements have been a potential threat to privacy, the potential has now come much closer to reality. The anti-privacy virus is out of the bottle, with its effects already felt in a bilateral FTA and likely to be replicated in NAFTA. Whether the potentially more powerful RCEP agreement will follow or perhaps abandon this direction is unpredictable, as is the future extent of the US’s influence.

APEC Framework and CBPRs

G. Greenleaf ‘Notes on APEC Framework and CBPRs’ (unpublished) May 2018

• All APEC members have endorsed the APEC Privacy Framework, a largely ‘1980s’ standard based on the OECD Guidelines, as revised in 2013, but with some additional weaknesses, particularly its ‘accountability’ principle of allowing data exports subject to ‘due diligence’. There are no enforcement mechanisms (Greenleaf, 2014, pp. 33-37). This endorsement does not carry any legal obligations with it – it is not a treaty. However, the Framework is the foundational standards on which the APEC CBPRs is based, and as such they are standards well below those of the GDPR (or the Directive).
• No Asian country (except Japan) is as yet a full participant in the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules system (APEC CBPRs), as only the US and Japan have appointed ‘Accountability Agents’ (AA). Both South Korea and Singapore have formally advised their intention to participate, and had their participation approved, but participation is inoperative until they appoint an AA, and the AA certifies companies as compliant. The Philippines, Vietnam and Australian governments have also stated intentions to participate Reasons why APEC CBPRs is a deceptive and flawed system are in Greenleaf, 2014, pp. 531-38. At present, the privacy dangers of APEC CBPRs in ASEAN countries are still unrealised.

• Some APEC countries are participants in APEC’s Cross Border Privacy Enforcement Arrangement (CPEA), a form of cooperation between DPA and PEAs which has no adverse privacy aspects (see Greenleaf, 2014, pp. 48-9).

• A Joint APEC–EU Working Group stated by APEC to be on ‘Promoting Interoperability between the APEC–EU Privacy Rules Systems’ has existed since 2012, and ‘agreed to continue discussions in Papua New Guinea in 2018’. In 2017 it ‘explored options for collaboration and a future work plan—including discussing mechanisms established under the GDPR such as certifications and codes of conduct’ (see history of Working Group). In 2014 the Working Group produced ‘a common referential for the structure of the EU system and the APEC system’, but this document must be treated with much scepticism (even before the GDPR) as being any type of pointer toward EU-APEC ‘interoperability’ (see Greenleaf, ‘A House of Cards’, 2014).

• The EU will not accept, for any country that is to receive a positive adequacy assessment, that EU-origin personal data is able to be export to CBPR-compliant companies. See the Japan section concerning the closing of the ‘Japanese back door’.

EU GDPR


Australia’s privacy protections are not regarded as ‘adequate’ by the European Union, under the 1995 Directive, despite occasional misapprehensions that they are. There has been some strengthening of Australia’s Privacy Act 1988 in the decade since the EU last examined the question of the adequacy of Australian law, but the most significant gaps have not since been plugged. However, as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force on 25 May 2018, the distance between Australian and EU data privacy protections may be greater than it was under the Directive. This article considers the ‘gaps’ remaining between the GDPR and Australian law, and whether they are likely to be significant for the question of adequacy, if and when it arises again.

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4 <http://www.cbprs.org/>
5 <http://www.cbprs.org/GeneralPages/APECCBPRSystemDocuments.aspx>.
9 <http://www.apec.org/~media/Files/Groups/ECSG/20140307_Reference-BCR-CBPR-reqs.pdf>
Global data protection Convention 108/108+

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279984

[Convention 108+ will be of increasing relevance to Asian data privacy laws once Asian jurisdictions start to accede to it. Korea is most likely to be the first country to accede. Four Asian countries are Observers on Convention 108’s Consultative Committee: Korea, Japan, Philippines and Indonesia.]

One week before the GDPR came into force on 25 May 2018, the ‘modernisation’ of data protection Convention 108 was completed by the Council of Europe on 18 May, by the parties to the existing Convention agreeing to a Protocol amending it (‘Protocol’). The new version of the Convention is now being called ‘108+’ to distinguish it.

This article analyses some aspects of the relationships between 108 and 108+, and further developments at the Plenary Meeting of the Convention’s Consultative Committee in Strasbourg, 19-21 June 2018 including a conference to ‘launch’ the new 108+.

The transition from 108 to 108+ is complex. Any new countries wishing to accede will have to accede to the Protocol (i.e to 108+) as well as to Convention 108, except for a handful of countries previously invited to accede.

There are two options for when Convention 108+ will come into force. One involves ratification by all existing 52 parties; the other could see it in force between ratifying parties as early as 2023.

Accession to Convention 108+ will have a positive effect on applications for ‘adequacy’ assessments to the EU under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), but the extent to which 108+ compliance will be sufficient for EU adequacy is uncertain.

The article discusses these various complexities.
North-East Asia

China


A recommended standard entitled ‘Information Security Techniques - Personal Information Security Specification’ (the ‘Standard’), was circulated by China’s National Standardization Committee in late 2017, and provides the most detailed specifications yet for how Chinese authorities will interpret and apply existing data privacy laws to private and public-sector entities. [Authors’ Note: The Standard was officially released on 29 December 2017, after publication of this article, and will become effective on 1 May 2018.]

We have assessed the data privacy provisions of the 2016 Cybersecurity Law as ‘China’s most comprehensive and broadly applicable set of data privacy principles to date’, going beyond the five main laws and regulations dealing with data privacy enacted from 2011-14, but that it is still missing several common elements found in other jurisdictions’ data privacy laws, such as explicit user access rights, requirements on data quality and special provisions for sensitive data, as well as no specialist data protection authority (DPA). The omission of the first of these -- explicit subject access rights -- means that China’s law does not yet include one of the most fundamental elements of a data privacy law.

In this article, we examine the additional elements the Standard brings to our understanding of the 2016 Cybersecurity Law, and whether it advances China on its long march towards a national data privacy law. Our overall conclusion is that the Standard is an important step forward in the evolution of China’s data privacy protections because of its comprehensive scope; the potential breadth of its definition of ‘personal information’; inclusion for the first time of extra protections for ‘personal sensitive information’; explicit inclusion of a right access; collection minimization, and appeals against automated processing. This article discusses a draft Standard, from which the final Standard may diverge.

The most significant implications of this Standard for businesses operating in China are:

● Its application to all private sector organisations involved in ‘personal information processing’, whether customers, employees or others.

● The definition of ‘personal information’ could potentially be interpreted more broadly than under some European or similar laws, even if it is not intended to be broader that the full scope of EU definitions. Therefore, considerable care must be taken in any use of any data relating to a person, at least until the approach of Chinese authorities is clear.

● The definition of ‘personal sensitive information’ is both open-ended, but also with named categories much broader than in many other laws, thus requiring great care.

● The suggested obligations in relation to subject access, minimum collection of data, and restrictions on automated processing, because these are not found in other laws.
Japan


The European Commission issue its draft Decision on the adequacy of Japan’s data protection law in September 2018 (see below). This article argues that the draft Decision, in relation to the private sector, does not contain sufficient justification that Japan meets the EU’s criteria for adequacy, described in the Decision as requiring that Japan “guarantees a level of protection ‘essentially equivalent’ to that ensured” within the EU.

Seven areas of insufficient justification are examined: (i) How is Japan’s enforcement regime ‘essentially equivalent’ to the EU? (ii) Is consent a sufficient basis for an onward transfer regime? (iii) Can an “essentially equivalent” law exclude Japanese citizens from its protections? (iv) Is there a loophole for “readily collated” personal information? (v) ‘Sectoral’ exclusions from PPIA are excessive, but do they have parallels in the GDPR? (vi) Reliability of translations of key documents. (vii) The extent of other gaps between Japanese and EU laws, including requirements for data protection by design and by default; data portability; mandatory DPIAs; mandatory DPOs; and de-linking (“right to be forgotten”); and very weak protections in relation to automated decision-making and data breach notification.

The article considers, if the draft Japanese Decision was adopted “as is”, what conclusions might be drawn by some governments in other countries that are planning to amend or enact data privacy laws with adequacy in mind? If others say "We will have what Japan is having?", what are the consequences for the future of adequacy? This requires all EU institutions to consider some fundamental questions about the meaning of both adequacy and “essentially equivalent”, in the course of improving or rejecting this draft Decision.

Draft adequacy Decision by EU Commission
Since the article below was written, the Commission has issued a draft adequacy Decision concerning Japan:


The draft Decision does not seriously address any of the issues raised in the article below. Other EU institutions (EDPS, EDPB, LIBE Committee) will form their views on what the Commission is proposing. Perhaps NOYB and the CJEU will do so in due course.


On 17 July 2018 the European Commission announced that it had successfully concluded with Japan ‘their talks on reciprocal adequacy’, and that the Commission would adopt its adequacy finding once ‘relevant internal procedures are complete’. The draft decision is not yet available.
This article commences by noting seven such procedures, and the numerous EU bodies that could have a substantive influence on the final decision, including the European Data Protection Board (EDPBB) and the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament. The draft ‘Supplementary Rules’ by Japan’s DPA (the PIPC), on which the decision is substantially based, is explained, and four aspects of them which will benefit European data subjects are set out.

The article then examines the following issues which EU bodies will need to consider: (i) the transparency of adequacy assessment processes; (ii) the applicability of the decision to Japan’s public sector; (iii) whether some personal information transferred from the EU might fall outside Japan’s definition of what is protected; (iv) whether the enforcement of Japan’s data privacy laws does or can meet the standards of the GDPR; (v) whether, even though the Commission is preventing APEC-CBPRs compliance being a basis for onward transfers, its proposed replacement with an almost entirely consent-based mechanism is protective enough; and (vi) whether a law where the key elements of adequacy can benefit only Europeans can be ‘essentially equivalent’.

The path to the EU’s decision on whether Japan’s privacy protections are adequate has many rivers to cross.

[Some of these criticisms were set out at greater length in an earlier article, below, which prompted the EU Commission’s decision to block the ‘Japanese back door’.]

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096370

Assessments by the European Commission of whether non-EU countries provide an ‘adequate’ level of data protection so as to enable a positive EU decision under Article 25 of the 1995 data protection Directive (‘adequacy decisions’) usually receive little discussion while the process is underway. The criteria which have been used within the EU for the assessment of adequacy derive partly from the Directive itself, from the Schrems decision, and from the opinions of the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP). A simplified version of these complex criteria commences this article. [Note: This article was written before the Article 29 Working Party’s ‘Adequacy Referential (Updated)’ (November 2017) was available, but it makes no substantive difference to this article.]

It is therefore unusual that both Japan and South Korea made public in 2016 that they were applying for positive adequacy assessments by the EU, and that general comments about these assessments progressing have been made by the Commission and by representatives of the two countries. Japan and the EU are considering simultaneous findings of adequacy, which Japanese law also allows. Even more unusual is that Korea decided to make its own ‘Self Assessment’ of the adequacy of its data protection in 2016, and then updated it in 2017 after changing the scope of the assessment sought. This article considers Japan’s application, and Part II will consider that of Korea.

It is not the purpose of these articles to suggest what the Commission’s conclusions should be, or might be, in the case of either country. Any proper assessment of a country’s claims to adequacy of data protection is likely to take hundreds of pages, not a short article. Nevertheless, there needs to be public discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the data protection offered by candidate countries, prior to any assessment being made, because of the importance of such decisions for both international trade, and for the protection of human rights. There also needs to be critical consideration of the quality of the decisions made by the
EU bodies involved, once they are made, and analysis of what can be learned from them in relation to future assessments.

This article discusses three of the issues which the EU will have to take into account in its assessment of Japan’s application:

(i) The definition of ‘personal information’ in Japan’s legislation includes two ‘carve-outs’. It only includes data which ‘which can be readily collated with other information and thereby identify a specific individual’. Its 2015 amendments exempted a new concept of ‘anonymously processed information’, prescribing measures of anonymisation potentially different from those accepted in the EU.

(ii) Japan’s restrictions on personal data exports include an exception designed to allow compliance by exports to overseas businesses (at present, only in the US) certified under the APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules system (CBPRs). The issue raised for the EU is whether this would allow onward transfer of personal data originating from the EU, without providing adequate protection.

(iii) Prior to enactment of slightly expanded enforcement powers, and creation of a data protection authority (DPA) in 2015, Japan’s data privacy laws had received negligible enforcement. These new enforcement measures have only been in effect since May 2017, so it is therefore an issue that there has as yet been no time for the Japanese system to demonstrate the extent to which they will actually be used, that the failures of past enforcement have been reversed, and that compliance with the requirements of the Directive can be demonstrated.

How EU institutions address these issues is important for this and all future adequacy assessments, both under the Directive and under the GDPR.

Korea

New amendments to Korea’s Network Act
Since the article below was written, Korea has enacted legislation (passed 30 August 2018; in effect March 2019) concerning the second set of issues discussed in the article below, and some other issues relevant to an EU adequacy assessment of Korea. The key amendments will have these effects (see article for some issues):

• Foreign online business with sufficient nexus with Korea must designate a local agent (similar to EU GDPR art. 27). However, local agent will be liable for ensuring compliance by foreign business with Korean law (and foreign business will also be liable for breaches by agent). May also apply to foreign transferees of data. Nexus with Korea will be based on scale of business, by users or revenue (to be decided) and (probably) lack of a Korean office.
• Data exports will still depend on (high standard) consent of data subject (3% penalty), and onward transfers to 3rd country now have same protections. Some exceptions.
• Data exports require protective measures (now the responsibility of the agent), including data breach notifications. Presidential Decree will further define measures.

For details, see Bae Kim and Lee LLC ‘Korean data law amendments pose new constraints for cross-border online services and data flows’ 5 September 2018 <https://www.lexology.com/library/document.ashx?g=c4fa0a24-43a5-43a8-a925-082d84c1f17e>
In relation to the first issue discussed, Korean government websites continue to include translation of the PIPA (the general data privacy law) which differ in whether ‘easily combined’ is included in the definition of ‘personal information’. Not so for Network Act.

Whether changes made to date will satisfy EU adequacy requirements is unclear.


https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102070

[The first part of this article http://ssrn.com/abstract=3096370 summarised the criteria and procedures by which the European Union has assessed the ‘adequacy’ of data protection in third countries, and considered, in light of those criteria, some issues which could arise in relation to Japan’s current application.]

Korea’s data protection system was assessed as the strongest in Asia in 2014, and since then its enforcement aspects have been further strengthened. This article considers two main issues which could arise in relation to the EU’s assessment of its adequacy, both of which have some similarity to Japan. Questions concerning the necessary independence and powers of a data protection authority have already led to the application being ‘scaled back’ to cover only those parts of the private sector subject to the ‘Network Act’, which is administered by the Korean Communications Commission (KCC).

The first issue is whether ‘personal information’ has a broad enough scope under the Act. It only applies to information which can identify a specific individual ‘when it is easily combined with other information’, so ‘easily’ excludes some information. Second, a contested set of Guidelines for De-identification of Personal Data, without clear legal status, supposedly allow some personal data to be partially removed from the scope of the Network Act, when followed. These procedures may allow a broader exemption from data privacy laws that would be allowed in the EU.

The second issue is whether Korea’s provisions controlling personal data exports, and particularly ‘onward transfers’ of personal data originally received from the EU, are strong enough. The Network Act currently requires data subjects to be informed of details of data exports before providing consent, but not of the state of the law in the recipient country. It is questionable whether this would satisfy EU requirements. Proposed amendments to the law to require foreign data recipients to do likewise before further exports have questionable enforceability. The proposed amendments also include two new mechanisms under which it is unclear whether data exports may take place which could potentially be used to allow transfers to APEC-CBPRs compliant companies (at present, those in the US) with lower protective standards. Such provisions need clarification in the course of an adequacy assessment.

The two parts of this article illustrate why, while adequacy assessment is not a black box, it is not very transparent in its principles or operation. Consequently, independent analyses need to be made of issues requiring consideration by EU authorities in relation to their assessments of particular countries, as part of more general public debate.

A concluding observations is that the way in which the EU deals with the effect on adequacy of laws facilitating exports to APEC-CBPRs compliant companies may be of great importance to the future of the EU’s concept of ‘adequacy’ as a means of protecting the rights of EU citizens
by insisting upon a high standard of data protection in foreign countries where their data will be processed.
South-East Asia

Thailand

Amended Thai draft Bill
An amended version of the draft Bill discussed in the article below has been released, and is subject to public hearings from 5 to 20 September 2018.

See Baker & McKenzie ‘New draft Personal Data Protection Bill issued for public hearing – Substantial changes following GDPR’ Client Alert  September 2018 (no URL available), which lists the main changes as:

- ‘a shorter transition period from 1 year to 180 days, definitions of personal data, extraterritorial applicability, data subject notification requirements, consent requirements, exemptions for collection of personal data from other sources, explicit consent requirements for sensitive data and new exemptions related thereto, records of processing activities, and the prescribed criminal and administrative fines and imprisonment’
- ‘new obligations and concepts … including the data subject’s right to data portability and the right to object, consent of minors, representatives of controllers or processors who are not established in Thailand, Data Protection Officers, exemptions from cross-border transfer requirements for transfers within the same business group, and punitive damages’.

The proposed Thai Bill is therefore now closer to the GDPR in many respects, but not in relation to the key weaknesses listed below.

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227862

Thailand is the most economically significant country in East Asia which does not yet have anything resembling a general data privacy law, but on 22 May 2018, just before the EU’s GDPR came into force, a draft Personal Data Protection Bill (PDPB) was approved by the Thai Cabinet for submission to the Council of State and the National Legislative Assembly. After ten years of various draft Bills, there are a number of reasons why the current Bill is much more likely to be enacted. A local factor is that lack of data privacy has recently become very controversial in Thailand because a mobile phone operator, exposed 46,000 customer records (names, addresses, scans of ID cards and passports) but apparently faces no legal consequences. An external factor is the extra-territorial reach of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in force as of 25 May 2018, which is referred to constantly (although often with exaggeration) by Thai commentators as posing problems for Thai businesses unless Thailand adopts a compatible law. This article critically reviews the PDPB, by reference to the standards of international privacy instruments. It concludes that Thailand’s Bill is one of reasonable strength by current global standards, except for its major deficiencies in the independence of its DPA, and the excessive degree of potential exceptions to its operation.
Key strengths of the PDPB:

- Comprehensive scope of all sectors (assuming public sector coverage), with an undesirable complete exception for credit reporting, and for legislative and judicial bodies (rather than by functions);
- Wide extra-territorial application to overseas processing (though differing from GDPR);
- Collection [and processing] has a strong consent basis, with consent able to be withdrawn;
- Exceptions to consent-based processing similar to GDPR;
- Sensitive data protected but not genetic data or biometrics;
- Requirement of regular privacy impact assessments (but is it enforceable?);
- De-identification when retention period expires;
- Data breach notification requirements, to DPA and to data subjects;
- Processors have direct obligations (security; breach notification);
- Transfers to foreign countries must meet a standard of protection, set by the DPA;
- Statutory provisions for compensation for damage;
- Administrative fines by DPA;
- DPA authorised to enter into agreements with foreign DPAs.

Key weaknesses of the PDPB:

- Complex administrative/enforcement structure, with no single body identifiable as the DPA carrying enforcement powers;
- Lack of guaranteed independence of the main bodies in the administrative/enforcement structure. Powers of Minister to suspect action of the DPA largely negate independence.
- Exceptions can be made by Ministerial Regulation (to processing without consent; to definitions of sensitive data);
- Standards for foreign transfers are not set by the Act, but by the DPA;
- Administrative fines are manifestly inadequate (up to US$16K only);
- No explicit opt-out provision for direct marketing;
- Lack of a right of appeal against decisions of PDPC or expert Panels.

Indonesia

G. Greenleaf ‘Notes on Indonesia’s draft Data Protection Law’ (unpublished), May 2018

Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika (Kominfo), (Minister of Communication and Informatics in English – also sometimes called MOCI) has lead responsibility for the drafting of a comprehensive Data Protection Bill, in consultation with other government bodies. The version discussed below dates from April 2018, and is an internal government version. The following summary is based on an incomplete translation of the Bill which may be unreliable on some points.
Some of these apparent weaknesses may only be due to a poor translation.

- Concept of ‘data owner’ rather than ‘data subject’ may cause problems by confusion of property rights (and thus alienability) with data protection rights;
- There is no automatic destruction of PD once purpose is completed, it must be requested;
- The Commission does not appear to have legislatively guaranteed independence or tenure (this may be due to lack of familiarity with Indonesian law); this may be a key weakness;

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2017-2018 articles to further update Graham Greenleaf's Asian Data Privacy Laws

• Various exceptions to data export restrictions may be both too weak; others may be too strong;
• There are many GDPR principles which do not appear to be included, such as:
  • Separate obligations imposed on processors;
  • Requirements for Data Protection Officers (DPOs);
  • Requirements for Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs);
  • Data portability;
  • Suspension of processing (inclusion is unclear);
  • Right to have human review of automated decisions.
• There is already a version of the ‘right to be forgotten’ in a 2016 amendment, but its implementation depends on regulations yet to be made (and is otherwise left to the Courts). It would be preferable if this right and its implementation requirements were stated in this Bill.

Despite these limitations (some of which may be resolved by translation clarifications), an initial overall assessment is that this Bill, if enacted in this form, would be one of the stronger laws in Asia, with standards much higher than the minimum standards for a data privacy law, higher than or equivalent to the 1995 Directive in many respects, but not yet as high as the GDPR.

Vietnam

Law 24 on Cybersecurity (English translation) (via Allens)<Linklaters)

Cybersecurity law (June 2018) establishes data localization requirements

L Biu, H. Nguyen and K. Nguyen ‘Client Update: Vietnam issues a stringent new cybersecurity law’, Allens><Linklaters, 22 June 2018

This article sets out many unanswered questions concerning the law.

W. Piemwichai and Tu Ngoc Trinh ‘Vietnam’s New Cybersecurity Law Will Have Major Impact on Online Service Providers’, Tilleke & Gibbons, June 18 2018 (via Lexology)

Singapore

G. Greenleaf ‘Notes on recent Singapore privacy developments’ (unpublished, May 2018)
These notes on 2017-8 developments refer to a book chapter on Singapore’s law (Greenleaf, 2018)11 and a report to the Asian Business Law Institute (Chia, 2018)12:
• Guidelines concerning ‘anonymisation’/de-identification of personal data which appear to leave more scope for use of personal data than European standards (Greenleaf, 2018, para. 8.13). ‘Anonymised’ data can also be exported without restriction (Chia, 2018, para. 55).

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PDPC suggestions that they will implement a ‘regulatory sandbox’ are probably aimed at allowing ‘big data’ experiments based on these Guidelines, or further weakening of them.

- The PDPC does not have independence from government (Greenleaf, 2018, paras. 8.64-65).

- Administrative fines up to S$1 million, with complaints regularly resulting, in practice, in S$10K-S$30K fines and occasionally S$50K (see Greenleaf, 2018, para. 8.70 for examples). Other than Korea, no other Asian law results in fines of this magnitude, this often, low though it is by European standards. In theory, the potential S$1 million fine meets European standards, at least prior to the GDPR.

- Regular reporting of decisions <https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/Commissions-Decisions/Data-Protection-Enforcement-Cases>, with respondents always named, giving transparency likely to affect respondent behaviour and encourage complainants. In Singapore, a small and compliance-conscious jurisdiction, ‘name and shame’ is likely to be an effective sanction. (Greenleaf, 2018, paras. 8.77-79).

**Proposed ‘reforms’**

- The PDPC is proposing to weaken the significance of consent even further (Greenleaf, 2018, para. 8.28, at end) (see PDPC’s Response to the Public Consultation on Approaches to Managing Personal Data in the Digital Economy).

- A ‘regulatory sandbox’ is under consideration by the PDPC (discussed above).

- A mandatory data breach notification scheme is supported by PDPC, based on ‘a consistent risk-based approach, and a higher threshold for notification to affected individuals as well as to PDPC’, and is likely to result in legislation (see ‘PDPC’s Response’ above).

**Data exports, APEC-CBPRs etc**

- PDPC has developed its own recommended (not mandatory) Standard Contract Clauses (SCCs) for transfers (Chia, paras. 83-85). EU – Singapore (and in effect, ASEAN) cooperation might be possible here.

- Mutual recognition (within ASEAN and beyond) of both CBPRs certifications (once Singapore is fully involved), and Trustmarks, are possible policy directions (Chia, paras. 86-93). The likelihood of these being based on the very low OECD/APEC standards – rather than even slightly higher Singaporean standards – if deemed by PDPC to be ‘comparable’ – is a considerable problem for the EU in obtaining transfer mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific which are consistent with EU GDPR adequacy standards.

- Singapore’s DPA and its controlling Department (IMDA) called for Singapore-based organisations to participate in Singapore’s Data Protection Trustmark (DPTM) certification, requiring that evaluation by one of three independent assessment bodies to determine whether they are able to meet their obligations under the PDPA. It is described as a ‘local certification scheme’ with no mutual recognition of other schemes at this stage. DPTM certification therefore does not authorise data exports to APEC-CBPRs certified companies in the US.

- According to Chia ‘Singapore is also exploring other avenues of bilateral or multilateral cooperation with foreign counterparts in the area of data protection, such as free trade

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negotiations, and mutual recognition of data protection regimes between Singapore and its key trade and economic partners.’

- A separate regime for international data transfers operates in the banking sector, prevailing in the event of inconsistency with the PDPA (Chia, 2018, paras. 21-31)
- Singapore is becoming a participant in the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules system (APEC CBPRs), having announced its intention to participate in July 2017, and had its application approved by APEC CBPRs Joint Oversight Panel in February 2018. The Minister states that Singapore will align its own proposed Trustmark standards with the APEC-CBPRs standards (Chia, 2018, para. 1-3). APEC-CBPRs will not operate in Singapore until it appoints an ‘Accountability Agent’ (AA).
South Asia

India

G. Greenleaf ‘Notes on post-Puttaswamy Indian developments (unpublished) August 2018

A nine judge ‘constitution bench’ of India’s Supreme Court unanimously decided in *Puttaswamy v Union of India* on 24 August 2017 that India’s Constitution recognises an inalienable and inherent right of privacy as a fundamental constitutional right. It is an implied right, because privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but it is implied by Article 21’s protections of life and liberty, and is also protected by other constitutional provisions providing procedural guarantees. Privacy protection is also required by India’s ratification of the UN’s *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), article 17 of which protects privacy. The decision will affect private sector practices (‘horizontal effect’) as well as actions by the Indian state (‘vertical effect’). The Court identified three main aspects of privacy: privacy of the body; privacy of information; and privacy of choice. Subsequent smaller constitution benches will now decide the constitutionality of various pieces of legislation, and practices, in light of the fundamental right of privacy. These include the constitutionality of India’s ID system (the Aadhaar), the criminalisation of homosexual conduct, and prohibitions on consumption of certain foods, and probably many more issues. It is very likely that, in order to protect the constitutionality of other legislation and practices, the Indian government will now have to legislate comprehensively to protect privacy in relation to both the public and private sectors in India.16

*Puttaswamy* also held that governments could only interfere with the fundamental right of privacy if they observed three conditions: first, there is a legitimate state interest in restricting the right; second, that the restriction is necessary and proportionate to achieve the interest; third that the restriction is by law.17 One immediate implication of this is that the government’s ‘Aadhaar’ biometric ID system, since it is clearly an interference with privacy, must observe these conditions of legitimacy and proportionality, both in its administration and in the legislation implementing it. The Aadhaar system is under current challenge before a constitution bench of the Supreme Court, which has heard the matter but reserved its decision. It is possible that a strong general data protection law, as well as specific improvements to the Aadhaar legislation, will be required by the Supreme Court as conditions for the constitutionally valid operation of the Aadhaar system.

In the year since *Puttaswamy*, considerable developments have taken place in India, notably:

- The draft *Personal Data Protection Bill 2018* (‘draft Bill’) 19 accompanying the SriKrishna Report.

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15 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India 2017 (10) SCALE 1.
16 See G. Greenleaf ‘Constitution Bench’ to decide India’s data privacy future’ (2017) 148 Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 28-31, for details of the committee established to draw up such a law, and background to the Court’s decision.
17 ibid
• The Indian Government has called for submissions on the draft Bill by 10 September 2018, following which the government will produce a Bill for introduction to Parliament.

• In the Navtej Johar v Union of India case (decided 6 September 2018) a five judge Constitution Bench of the Indian Supreme held unanimously that India's criminalization of homosexual conduct (s. 377 of the Criminal Code) was unconstitutional (as a result of Puttaswamy). The Indian government decided not to oppose the petition, saying it would leave the decision to the Court.
  
  o For analysis of the judgments, see Alok Prasanna Kumar 'Section 377 judgment could form beginning of a body of path-breaking jurisprudence in India' Scroll 6 September 2018.
  
  o For background, see Gautam Bhatia 'The Indian Supreme Court Reserves Judgment on the De-criminalisation of Homosexuality' Oxford Human Rights Hub, 15 August 2018.

• The five judge constitution bench in the Supreme Court case challenging the constitutionality of the Aadhaar ID system, and the Aadhaar Act 2016 (Puttaswamy again the lead petitioner) reserved its decision in May 2018, after a 40 day hearing (2nd longest in Indian history). 'Justice Chandrachud is the only link between the five-judge bench and the nine-judge bench which had ruled on right to privacy.'22 The Court's decision must be delivered by 2 October, on which date the current Chief Justice, who is part of the bench on this case, will retire.
  
  o The SriKrishna Report recommends amendments to the Aadhaar Act (separately from the question of constitutionality).

• Data localisation provisions in a directive by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), anticipating to some extent the data localization recommendations in the SriKrishna report.

Greenleaf, Graham, GDPR-Lite and Requiring Strengthening – Submission on the Draft Personal Data Protection Bill to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (India) (September 20, 2018)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252286

This submission concerns the draft Personal Data Protection Bill which accompanies the July 2018 Report of the Committee of Experts on Data Protection (‘Srikrishna Report’) appointed by the Indian government.

The submission makes five general comments about the Bill, on these topics:

1. The draft Bill is a serious and modern draft law, and should only be strengthened, not weakened by MeitY in preparing a Bill for submission to the legislature. The Indian government has compelling reasons to enact a Bill resembling this draft.

2. The Report and Bill both reflect a very different regulatory philosophy from the EU GDPR's radical dispersal of decision-making responsibility (and liability for wrong decisions) to data controllers. The Indian model is more prescriptive, but a justifiable regulatory option, provided it does not include excessive discretion to the government or the Data Protection Authority.

\[\text{\url{https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252286}}\]


\[\text{\url{http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-indian-supreme-court-reserves-judgment-on-the-de-criminalisation-of-homosexuality/}}\]

\[\text{Dhananjay Mahapatra 'Supreme Court reserves verdict on Aadhaar validity' Times of India, 11 May 2018}\]

3. The Bill’s data localisation requirements adopt an unjustifiable generic approach to data localisation, through blanket local copy requirements (with exceptions to be specified by government), and export prohibitions also specified by government.

4. The very broad exemptions from most of the Act for processing in the interests of State security or relating to law enforcement, although purportedly constrained by legality, necessity and proportionality (are dangerously vague).

5. The lack of complete independence of the DPIA, and the lack of any legislatively guaranteed independence by the Adjudicating Officers, represent unsound policy in relation to bodies whose function is to regulate government as well as the private sector.

The submission also includes fifteen more specific recommendations for improvements to the Bill.

Greenleaf, G India’s draft data protection Bill includes many GDPR-style protections (2018) Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 24-26
This article is primarily a detailed comparison of the draft Bill with the GDPR, plus some comments on the implications of the Supreme Court’s 26 September 2018 majority decision upholding the overall constitutionality of India’s biometric ID system (the Aadhaar), but disallowing some key features of its enabling legislation.

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062503

[This is for background to the Puttaswamy case] This article was written during the hearing of the most important case concerning privacy in Indian history, by a nine Judge ‘Constitution Bench’ of India’s Supreme Court, from July 19 to August 4 2017: Puttaswamy v Union of India. As explained, the case was to ‘determine whether or not privacy is a fundamental right under India’s Constitution. A positive answer will require answers to further questions, including what types of privacy are encompassed by the right, and whether it is only a ‘vertical’ right, enforceable against the State, or a ‘horizontal’ right, enforceable by one private individual against another. It will provide grounds for challenges to the validity of many aspects of legislation at all levels of Indian government, starting immediately with the Aadhaar Act 2016 concerning India’s ID system. If it is a horizontal right, the Indian government could be required to enact privacy legislation to implement the right, and would probably need to do so in any event in order to protect the constitutionality of legislation attacked on privacy grounds.’ [Note: Now that the Court has unanimously given such a positive answer, these consequences are playing out in numerous further cases.] The article outlines the main arguments provided by the petitioners, the government, and their allies.

The article also considers the cases immediately preceding the Puttaswamy decision. Viswam v Union of India concerned the constitutionality of Indian government’s attempt, by s. 139AA in the Income Tax Act, to require mandatory linking of the Aadhaar ID number to a person’s Permanent Account Number (PAN), a 10-digit alphanumeric number allocated by the Information Technology Department to individuals and entities. Despite the Court placing impediments before these plans while the constitutional issues remain unresolved, the Modi government’s ‘let’s see what we can get away with’ approach continues.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326250
Other South Asian countries

[The constitutional challenge by petitioner Ratnasabapathy in the Supreme Court against the issue of Sri Lanka’s new electronic national identity card (e-NIC), mentioned below, does not seem to have proceeded further since November 2017.]

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113158

The SAARC region (South Asian Area of Regional Cooperation), comprising the eight states of South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives and Afghanistan), is the Asian sub-region with the least development of data privacy laws. This article reviews the position in the seven South Asian countries other than India, since mid 2014.

Development of privacy protection in South Asia has been stalled by many factors, but there are now some reasons for optimism. Since a previous comprehensive review in mid-2014, there have been no new data privacy laws for any of these countries in the past three years. However, there are indicators that such laws are under development in four (Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives), plus significant developments in other countries in relation to Right to Information (RTI) laws, and some political and other developments important to note in relation to potential longer-term developments. There are no relevant regional developments resulting from the SAARC agreements.

However, the most significant regional factor is the possible implications of the Indian Supreme Court decision on the fundamental constitutional right of privacy. A nine judge ‘constitution bench’ of India’s Supreme Court unanimously decided in Puttaswamy v Union of India on 24 August 2017 that India’s Constitution recognises an inalienable and inherent right of privacy as a fundamental constitutional right. Puttaswamy has already had an effect on litigation in Sri Lanka, and is likely to affect privacy developments in South Asia and elsewhere for decades to come.